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Abstract 
Finland has opted for an ‘internalized solution’ when it comes to securing courts access to adequate 
scientific knowledge: in the administrative courts, in-house expert judges are part of the court’s 
panel. The expert judges have scientific or technical education but no lawyer’s qualifications, yet are 
considered judges as much as the judicial ones. In the Supreme Administrative Court and in the first 
court of appeal most, albeit not all, of the environmental cases are heard by panels with expert judges 
– notably, the cases dealing with nature conservation but not with the Water Act or the 
Environmental Protection Act are problematic in not receiving such attention. The combination of 
administrative judicial system of broad scope of review, in-house environmental expert judges and 
inquisitorial and investigative approach enables thorough consideration of the cases, allowing for an 
elegant solution to the fundamental epistemological and ontological challenges faced by 
environmental regulation – namely those of ‘legal questions and scientific answers’. The Finnish 
solution brings indisputable benefits and as such is recommended to other jurisdictions. 
Domestically, we suggest that national legislation be amended in order to convene cases dealing with 





Administrative judicial review, administrative environmental law, expert judges, scope of review, 
scientific knowledge in law 
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1 INTRODUCTION: EXPERT JUDGES ENGENDERING IN-HOUSE EXPERTISE 
When understood broadly as judicial decision-making on matters relating to the environment, 
environmental litigation has multiple paths. In Finland, some of the cases that could be described as 
‘environmental’ belong to the jurisdiction of the general courts – e.g., environmental crimes follow 
the path of criminal litigation.1  The vast majority of the cases relating to the environment are, 
however, dealt within the administrative branch: from the first instance administrative authorities via 
administrative courts to the Supreme Administrative Court (’the SAC’). In the trichotomy developed 
by Amirante, the Finnish system partially exemplifies the category of ‘internal specialization’, in 
which – instead of relying solely on the general jurisdictions or having separate 
institutions/structures to deal with environmental matters – ‘green judges’ are vested with the 
authority to deliberate environmental cases.2  
 
The Finnish administrative judicial procedure is scrutinized here in an attempt to 1) examine the 
scope (intensity) of review employed in the Finnish administrative judicial process, and 2) study the 
ways in which Finnish administrative courts acquire and employ the scientific or technical 
knowledge required for the decision-making they conduct within the boundaries set by the answer to 
the first question.3  Answering the first question (Chapter 2) describes the context in which the 
judges operate in Finnish administrative courts and, simultaneously, partially explains the solutions 
chosen for the second question. In order to provide context, the beginning of the procedural path for 
the first instance administrative authorities is shortly explained (Chapter 3), as is the Finnish 
referendary system. 
 
                                                        
1 Environmental crimes (impairment of the environment, nature conservation offences, building protection 
offences, etc.) were included in the Finnish Criminal Code in 1995 as its Chapter 48; later, Chapter 48a was 
added for natural resources offences (e.g. those regarding hunting and fishing). The English translation of the 
Criminal Code (rikoslaki 19.12.1889/39) is available at 
<http://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018). 
The authors wish to thank Pekka Vihervuori, president of Supreme Administrative Court of Finland until 
September 2018 and Kari Kuusiniemi president of the same institution from September 2018 on, for their 
helpful comments while drafting this paper. 
2 Only ‘partially’ since the judges with judicial training also sit cases other than environmental ones; only the 
‘expert judges’ focus solely on environmental matters, thus representing the ‘green judge’ typology. 
Amirante, Domenico ‘Environmental Courts in Comparative Perspective: Preliminary Reflections on the 
National Green Tribunal of India’ (2012) 29(2) Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 441, 446.   
3 Comparisons to other jurisdictions are conducted to a limited degree; see the foreword of this Special Issue 
for an extensive transnational analysis.  
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The answer to the second part (Chapter 4) is highly dependent on the existence of so-called ‘expert 
judges’: judges with scientific or technical education and without formal qualifications as lawyers, 
and how their expertise on environmental issues is put to practice in the courts’ decision-making 
processes.4 The concept ‘expert judge’ is employed here as a general term referring not only to the 
expert judges in the Vaasa Administrative Court but also the expert members of the Supreme 
Administrative Court – the differences and similarities between these two concepts are elaborated on 
in Chapter 4. Vaasa Administrative Court (‘the Vaasa court’, ‘Vaasa’) is significant since appeals on 
cases applying the Environmental Protection Act (‘the EPA’) or the Water Act (‘the Water Act’) are 
centralized there.5 In such cases, an expert judge must be part of the court’s panel. Environmental 
regulation in Finland is extensive, ranging from water construction regulation and environmental 
permitting systems to soil and water abstraction and mining regulations, from habitats and species 
conservation to land use planning and water management. Not all of these pieces of regulation are 
examined equally here: the focus is on the procedures (and associated substantial questions) of the 
EPA and the Water Act, which together form the substantive core of the administrative 
environmental permitting system and which, as mentioned, denominate cases that are dealt with in 
the Vaasa court.6 Furthermore, an anomaly in current environmental regulation system is explained: 
some of the cases dealing with nature conservation – i.e. those not concerning the Water Act or the 
EPA – are not guided to the Vaasa court, i.e. they are not scrutinized by an administrative court panel 
of both judicial and expert members.7 
 
In line with the global discussion of proceduralization of (environmental) law, the administrative 
judicial system in Finland is a closely-knit entity in which substantive and procedural matters                                                         
4 In what follows, ‘expertise’ is used to refer to scientific or technical knowledge provided by these expert 
judges. Here judicial expertise (provided by lawyer or the expert judges present in the court panel) is excluded 
from the concept, though judicial expertise is in principle comprehended as one form of expertise itself. 
5  The Environmental Protection Act (ympäristönsuojelulaki 527/2014) has unfortunately not yet been 
translated into English. However, the English version of the previous act from the year 2000 is available at 
<http://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086> (accessed 10 March 2018). The English version of the 
Finnish Water Act (vesilaki 587/2011) is available at <http://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2011/en20110587> 
(accessed 10 March 2018). 
6 Some pivotal parts of environmental law (e.g., building and land use planning regulations) are excluded 
from the examination. This does not imply that questions examined here might not also be relevant in those 
fields – the limitation of scope extracts the most crucial issues of the theme, but, concurrently, precludes all-
embracing examination. For the same reason, some significant fields of natural resources regulation, such as 
mining or forestry regulation, are also omitted. Of those fields, mining undertakings are often, albeit not 
always, regulated not only by their specific pieces of legislation but also by the EPA and the Water Act 
(especially with regards to the mining activities occurring after the initial exploration phases). 
7 The Supreme Administrative Court naturally deals with cases from the whole country, see text at fn 60ff. 
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influence each other at all levels, from administrative authorizations to their evaluation in the 
administrative courts.8 Towards the concluding discussion, questions on allocation of the cases and 
impartiality of the judges, issues that an expert judge system unavoidably provokes, are brought to 
the fore (Chapter 5). The discussion (Chapter 6) concludes the work and considers the benefits of the 
expert judge solution for environmental adjudication often requiring both judicial and non-judicial 
expertise, and whether other jurisdictions might have grounds to adopt the Finnish pattern.9  
 
Naturally, from some perspectives even the solution in which administrative courts are in the first 
place allowed to examine the substance of the administrative decision could be considered an 
infringement of trias politica.10 However, in the European and international legal reality, so stringent 
an interpretation might result in infringement of a Member State’s obligations. 11  Even though 
Finnish environmental regulation implements the same European (and international) environmental 
                                                        
8 On the proceduralization in European Union law and environmental law, see e.g. Sabel, Charles F. and 
Zeitlin, Jonathan ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ 
European Law Journal 14:3 (2008) 271–327; Scott, Joanne ‘Flexibility ‘Proceduralization’ and Environmental 
Governance in the EU’ in Scott, Joanne and De Búrca, Gráinne (eds, 2000) Constitutional Change in the 
European Union (Hart Publishing); Gunningham, Neil ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: 
Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 179; Louka, Elli (2004) Conflicting 
Integration: The Environmental Law of the European Union (Intersentia nv.) 67–73; and specifically in the 
context of water law, Howarth, William ‘Aspirations and Realities under the Water Framework Directive: 
Proceduralisation, Participation and Practicalities’ Journal of Environmental Law 21:3 (2009), 391, 394–8; 
Keessen, Andrea M. and others ’European river basin districts: are they swimming in the same 
implementation pool?’ Journal of Environmental Law 22:2 (2010), 197. 
9 Even though the first instance administrative authority is not a court, interpretation of laws occurs there in a 
manner roughly similar to the courts. The close-knit administrative-legal reality in (environmental) matters 
does not come without challenges; on the constitutional issues, see e.g. Fisher, Elizabeth Risk Regulation and 
Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing 2007) and Elliott, Mark The Constitutional Foundations of 
Judicial Review (Hart Publishing 2001).  
10  The judicial review interferes with the executive powers vested with the administration, yielding the 
constitutional concerns, Mäenpää, Olli ‘Judiciary v. Executive: Judicial Review and the Exercise of Executive 
Power’ (2017) 2–4 JFT 242, 248, 250. The English model is a notorious example of a system in which judicial 
review may interfere only with questions considered strictly legal, and the substance of administrative 
decisions or rules are considered as political, i.e. falling out of the scope of judicial review, Cane, Peter 
’Understanding judicial review and its impact’ in Hertogh, Marc and Halliday, Simon (eds) Judicial Review 
and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 
2004), 15, 17–8, 21–3. The Irish variation, with a comparable point of departure, is explained in Áine Ryall’s 
article ’Enforcing the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive in Ireland: The Evolution of the Standard 
of Judicial Review’ in (2018) Transnational Environmental Law (forthcoming). See also text at fn 22ff. 
11 See Mariolina Eliantonio’s article ‘The EU requirements for the standard of review and for the duty of 
national courts to access scientific knowledge in environmental litigation: a story of moving targets and vague 
guidance’ in this Special Issue. 
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law as all the Member States, the Finnish model for acquiring scientific knowledge from specific 
expert judges is, globally speaking, unusual. Its greatest benefit is that when the judges’ panel 
deliberates the case, the scientific expertise is present in the discussion, formulating the case and the 
scientific realities it entails – the questions asked are formulated not only by the lawyer but also by 
the expert judges.12 
 
From 2011 on, India has also had in-house expert judges on its National Green Tribunals (‘the 
NGT’). In the Indian context, the characteristics of in-house expert judges and judicial judges are 
similar to those of the Finnish solution: ‘the scientific experts with environmental knowledge work 
alongside legally qualified judges as collective environmental decision makers of homologous 
standing’.13 The system used in Finland is, however, deeply rooted in history: the arrangement was 
already in place in the era when Finland existed not as a nation but only as the eastern regions of 
Sweden. Contemporary Sweden has also kept the arrangement of ‘expert judges’ to date (although 
the court systems differ organizationally).14 The modern-day Swedish and Finnish systems are still 
greatly similar: in Sweden as well the expert judges are part of the court panel in both administrative 
courts and the supreme administrative court when these deal with cases considered ‘environmental’, 
as the commentary piece by a Swedish expert judge right after this article serves well to illustrate.15 
                                                        
12 This advantage is returned to in more detail in the discussion (Chapter 6), see text at fn(97)ff. 
13 In India, scientific experts have a central role in the environmental tribunal’s normative structure,  Gill, 
Gitanjali Nain 'Environmental Justice in India: The National Green Tribunal and Expert Members' (2016) 5(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law 175, 177, 183, 186. See also Amirante (n 2).  
14 For centuries, the region of Finland was part of Sweden and this tie was interrupted only in 1809, when 
Russia conquered the eastern regions of Sweden. Russia declared the area a grand duchy of its empire, albeit 
allowing it to maintain much of its autonomy, including but not limited to the existing (i.e. Swedish) 
administrative system. Following the turbulence of the Russian Civil War, Finland declared its independence 
in 1917 and continued to foster its originally Swedish administrative and legal traditions. Of the historical 
developments see e.g. Vihervuori, Pekka ‘Private and public ownership of water areas—structures and 
implications of the Finnish model’ in Hollo, Erkki J. (ed) Water Resources Management and the Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2017), 98, 102–6, Tegner Anker, Helle and others ‘The Role of Courts in Environmental 
Law—A Nordic Comparative Study’ (2009) Nordic Environmental Law Journal 9, 11, 16, available online at 
<http://nordiskmiljoratt.se/onewebmedia/NMT-202009.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018). 
15 Svedberg, Rolf ‘Natural Sciences in Environmental Law’ in this Special Issue. Sweden has five Mark- och 
miljödomstolar (‘Land and Environmement Court’) that deal with environmental matters, either as the first 
instance or after an appeal from municipal or administrative level, and one Mark- och miljööverdomstolen 
(‘The Supreme Land and Environment Court’). The cases examined in this branch include a broad range of 
issues considered ‘environmental’: from environmental and water law via land use and building, expropriation 
to health, nature conservation etc. Specifically on the Swedish system, see Tegner Anker and others (n 14) 
13–5 Fig. 4.  
 6 
The expert judge solution may have been inspired by the fact that Sweden was a relatively vast and 
scarcely populated kingdom. In such a geographic and demographic situation, expertise of any kind 
was in short supply and having it all on hand in the court panel – and, concurrently, blurring the 
dividing line between different forms of expertise – may have simply been a practical solution. This 
is, however, mere speculation: to our knowledge this interesting question has not been specifically 
addressed in academic research.16 
 
2 THE WIDTH AND DEPTH OF THE SCOPE OF REVIEW 
Before embarking on the substantive side of administrative judicial review in the key environmental 
matters, first the general question of scope (intensity) of review is discussed. Understanding how 
legality review and principle of judicial investigation are comprehended in Finland is not only 
interesting as such but it also establishes the frame of reference for the second question presented 
here, the acquisition and employment of scientific expertise entailed in the work of the 
administrative courts. 
 
2.1. Reviewing Legality 
Similarly to its German or Swedish counterparts, Finnish administrative courts are understood to be 
like the general courts: their task is to review the first instance administrative authorizations and they 
are not part of the administration itself, unlike the case in e.g. France. 17  However, unlike in 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
The Swedish system is included in analysis by Pring, George and Pring, Catherine ’Greening Justice, Creating 
and Improving Environmental Courts and Tribunals’ (The Access Initiative 2009), available online at 
<https://www.eufje.org/images/DocDivers/Rapport%20Pring.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018). It must be 
noted that on pages 56 and 59 they give slightly misguided information on the Finnish system. Finnish 
administrative courts do not rely solely on external institutions for technical knowledge but also on in-house 
expert judges as described here. Thus classing the Netherlands and Finland in the same category is incorrect; 
see also Backes, Chris ‘Organizing Technical Knowledge in Environmental and Planning Law Disputes in the 
Netherlands—the Foundation for Advising the Administrative Judiciary’ in and the foreword of this Special 
Issue. Regarding the internal and external sources of expertise available for Finnish administrative courts on 
environmental matters see text at fn(73)ff. 
16 Earlier in history, from 1215 on, the lack of educated lawyers explained the emergence of laymen in courts 
in Scandinavia (whereas adequate numbers of lawyers and centralized government explain the solutions opted 
for in the continental Europe and European common law tradition), Pihlajamäki, Heikki ‘Länsimaisen 
maallikkotuomarin kolme mallia: Common law, Manner-Eurooppa ja Skandinavia (The Three Variations of 
Western Lay Judges: Common Law, Continental Europe and Scandinavia)’ (2013) 4 Lakimies 583, 592–3. 
17 Comparison of the two systems from the Finnish perspective, Kanninen, Heikki ‘“Juger l’administration, 
c’est encore administrer” –maksiimi nykyajan hallintolainkäytön valossa’ in Avoin, tehokas ja riippumaton. 
Olli Mäenpää 60 vuotta juhlakirja (Edita 2010) 217, 219, 227. 
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Germany, the Finnish and Swedish peculiarity is the broad scope (or depth) of review the 
administrative courts entail in their deliberation. As Vihervuori summarizes:  
 
”The prime concern of administrative judicial process is to review legality of the appealed 
authorization. Within the limits of the appeal the scope of review is similar to that in the 
administrative authority. For example, the substance matter is issuance of the building 
permit, not only the legal or factual question underpinning it.”18 
 
In other words, the scope of review extends to all the relevant matters of which the authorization or 
permit consists. The examination is active and the only restriction comes from the appeal: the courts 
cannot exceed the request or demand.19 This broad scope of review, coupled with often-flexible 
environmental norms and principles, grants the courts latitude in their deliberations, partly enabled by 
the expert judges present in the discussions. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the width of 
review is contingent on the substantive legislation: consideration in cases dealing with the EPA is 
often more limited than in cases dealing with the Water Act. Also, long tradition in judicial practice 
in the courts has settled many disputes, narrowing down the marginal of judicial review. 20 The 
general guideline of restraint in dealing with straightforward policy issues is also retained in the 
judicial review of environmental matters.21 
 
It is interesting that in the Finnish context legality is understood relatively broadly. The reality it 
furthers is not foreign to (environmental) administrative judicial review in the global context: the 
Indian NGTs are competent to decide upon a broad range of ‘questions of law and fact’, to the extent 
                                                        
18 Translation and emphasis here by the authors. Vihervuori, Pekka ‘Totuudesta hallintolainkäytössä (Truth in 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action)’ in Juhlajulkaisu Pekka Hallberg 1944 –12/6 – 2004 (Suomalainen 
lakimiesyhdistys 2004) 496. 
19 Mattila, Jukka ‘Oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti hallintotuomioistuimessa’ in Korkein hallinto-oikeus 90 
vuotta (Otavan Kirjapaino 2008) 278, 284. 
20 The difference is rooted in the manner in which consideration is guided in the said acts: the Water Act 3:4 
allows for balancing of interests whereas the EPA 48 § does not. The relatively long history of the Water Act 
and its national importance make it an interesting example of how broad and flexible norms become firmer 
although the phrasing of the norms remains intact—on the Water Act see Vihervuori (n 14) 98, 112–5. 
21 As found by Olli Mäenpää, ‘Courts should show reticence in other issues that are not directly connected to 
the evaluation of legality. Policy issues and the actual exercise of executive power are especially considered to 
limit judicial review’ in Mäenpää (n 10) 250. He is, however, quick to admit that the dividing line between 
accepted consideration and administrative policy may be difficult to decipher.  
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that Gill describes the right to be of ‘wide and overriding’ nature.22 It is good to remember that the 
SAC may deal with the most difficult cases, in which the legal interpretation is far from clear. (Albeit 
it was only in 2018 that the SAC was granted the right to select those environmental cases it wishes 
to consider; previously the path to the highest level of appeal was open to all, resulting in less 
complex cases also being dealt with in the SAC.) 23 It is reasonable that in deciding upon such 
matters, the intensity of review is not unnecessarily constrained, but the court is granted latitude in its 
consideration. Previously an established interpretation of trias politica might have been influential in 
this concern: if the decision depended mainly on the expediency consideration (on the reasonabless 
of the decision or discretion; in other words, not mainly on judicial considerations), the SAC ought to 
have referred the case in that regard to the Council of State.24 The 21st century witnessed no cases 
being referred to the Council of State, and even in the second half of the 1990s the number of cases 
referred declined from 0,5 % to 0,1 %, yielding speculations that the section would simply be 
removed in the travaux preparatoires of the 2006 amendment – however, the section was left 
intact.25 The development was, however, incessant, and thus even though ‘[t]he fact that a principle is 
not respected in the everyday operations of the courts does not necessarily imply that the principle 
itself has passed into desuetude,’ as Minkkinen duly notes26, this section was desuetude before finally                                                         
22 Even the principle of ex debito justitiae (in the interests of justice) is employed, which gives grounds to 
consider the scope of review in the NGT’s to be even wider than that of the Finnish administrative courts (in 
environmental matters), Gill (n 13) 187. Then again e.g. the English would shrink from the Finnish 
understanding of legality, so limited is their judicial review, Cane (n 10) 18, 21; also the ‘unreasonableness’ or 
‘irrationality’ demanded in the Irish system in order to embark on merit’s review is also relevantly more 
limited, Ryall (n 10). Then again the Australian model of evaluating the merits of the decision to find out 
whether it is the ‘correct or preferable one’ and whether the quality of decision is adequate, resembles the 
Finnish option, Ky, Patrick ‘Qualifications,Weight of Opinion, Peer Review and Methodology: A Framework 
for Understanding the Evaluation of Science in Merits Review’ (2012) 24(2) Journal of Environmental Law 
207, 214–5. 
23 Collection of statutes 974–978/2017 (accepted 19 December 2017, in force 1 January 2018), Government’s 
Proposal 43/217 (HE 43/217). The proposal was jointly prepared by the Ministry of the Environment and the 
Ministry of Justice. 
24 The Council of State i.e. the Government (the highest executive body). Supreme Administrative Court Act 
2 § in its previous form (1265/2006), substantially unchanged from the original version from 1918. Tegner 
Anker and others (n 14) 17.  
25  Mäenpää, Olli ’Tarkoituksenmukaisuus—vallanjaon rajapyykki?’ in Hurri, Samuli Demokraattisen 
oikeuden ehdot (Tutkijaliitto 2008) 137, 139–41, fn 1; see also Minkkinen, Panu ‘”Vähiten vaarallinen 
valtioelin”? — Tuomiovalta, vallanjako ja demokratia (‘‘The least dangerous branch’? – Judicial power, the 
separation of powers, and democracy)’(2016) Politiikka 58(3) 224, and for an all-embracing analysis of the 
trias politica’s critical points in Finnish constitutional life, Tuori, Kaarlo ‘Vallanjako—vaiettu oppi’ (2005) 
Lakimies 7–8, 1021–1049. 
26 Minkkinen, Panu ‘‘If Taken in Earnest’: Criminal Law Doctrine and the Last Resort’ (2006) The Howard 
Journal 45(5) 521, 530; seconded by Mäenpää (n 17) 121.  
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being removed in the most recent amendment, which took effect in 2016.27 In the international 
context the Finnish solution is somewhere in between the models adopted in the USA and in 
Germany, but closer to the latter.28  
 
Comprehension of legality aside, some procedural limitations apply, irrespective of the changes made 
to the referring clause: the courts must not exceed the parties’ claims (ultra petita) and the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction must be considered ex officio.29 Also, in the Finnish system the courts have 
wider options than those of annulment or injunction but they can also amend the permit and its 
conditions. However, if the permit holder seeks more lenient permit conditions as the only appellant, 
the interpretation of the reformatio in peius principle obliges the courts not to repeal the permit even 
if they considered that the project should have not been allowed in the first place. (In such cases 
neither is tightening the permit conditions allowed.) The case is naturally different in the vast 
majority of the cases in which environmental NGO’s or other parties also appeal the authorization, 
when even contradictory demands further broaden the possibilities for the appeal authority in their 
task. In cases with multiple appellants the court can have rather broad scope of review.30                                                         
27  Amendment enacted with statute 892/2015, initiated with the Government’s Proposal 230/2014 (HE 
230/2014), deleted the notion from the Act. The development towards becoming desuetude had been so 
consistent in the 20th century it was even slightly surprising that the stance regained formal awakening in the 
2006 amendment, Mäenpää (n 18) 121. However, there were good reasons behind such a choice: retaining the 
section emphasized that in principle the questions of expediency were not to be examined in the judicial 
process; only exceptionally could such a claim be examined in courts who, with such a case at hand, were 
ordered to refer it to the Council of State, Mäenpää (n 25) 141–2 (grounding such a reasoning to the original 
preparatory works from 1917). 
28 Mäenpää (n 25) 145. 
29 Mäenpää, Olli, Hallintoprosessioikeus (Judicial Procedure in Administrative Courts) (2nd edition, 
WSOYpro 2007), 89. Understanding of ultra peius is similar in the French tradition, Kanninen (n 17) 224–5. 
In the Granö Case the Vaasa court has even repealed a decision by the CEDTE (the surveilling authority, 
‘Centre for Economic Development, Transport, and the Environment’) on a nature conservation matter when 
the CEDTE had not had territorial jurisdiction due to a recent change, even though the matter had not been 
considered in the appeal. The Court remitted the case to the correct CEDTE. Vaasa Administrative Court 
Decision 24 February 2016 N:o 16/0084/1.  
30 Mäenpää (n 29) 502, Pärnänen, Sinikka Vesistöjen ennallistaminen uiton jälkeen (Suomalainen 
Lakimiesyhdistys 2012) 118, referring to Mäenpää, Olli Hallintolupa (Lakimiesliiton kustannus 1992) 211, 
339. Also in Australia the understanding of merit’s review the court may vary the decision but the option of 
making a substitute decision is not available to the Finnish administrative courts who, be such the situation, 
must remit the case back to the first instance authority, Ky (n 22) 215.  
According to the Vaasa court’s records from 2014–17 the largest and most influential (albeit naturally not the 
only) Finnish environmental NGO (The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, ‘the FANC’) or its 
regional associations have appealed on 123 first instance administration’s decisions of which 83 dealt with the 
EPA (of which 38 were cases on the peat production, 10 on mining and 10 on nature conservation) and only 6 
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2.2 Principle Of Judicial Investigation  
As with scope of review, the interpretation and usage of the principle of judicial investigation is 
comprehensive in Finnish administrative courts, serving also the needs of gathering of scientific 
knowledge to equip the decision-making. According to the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act, 
the appellate authority must make sure that the matter is thoroughly examined and, if the case 
requires, ask for further clarification from the first instance administrative authority or the parties. 
The appellate authority must on its own initiative investigate the matter to the extent that 
impartiality, fairness, or the nature of the case necessitate.31 Even though the concept of ‘evidence’ is 
used in the Act, in environmental cases concepts of examination, investigation or reporting are 
preferred to avoid connotations with evidence or proof: the classical legal concepts that stem from 
criminal law are not always best at illustrating deliberation on environmental matters, neither in the 
courts nor in the administrative authority. 32  The two aspects are interlinked: the administrative 
authority is allowed to make regulatory and unilateral decisions, thus reviewing them in the courts is 
different from other situations.33 All information in any reports or documents available is required 
for the basic inquiry of the case; their role is more extensive than is the case in traditional evaluation 
of evidence.34  
 
The principle of judicial investigation is interpreted similarly in the first instance administrative 
authority and the administrative courts. The obligation of impartiality applies to both.35 However, 
this emphasis on the administrations’ active role is not meant to imply that administrative authorities 
and administrative courts are conceptually or organizationally merged in Finland, or that the latter is 
considered as an extension of the former. Earlier, this might have been the case, but recent decades 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
land use and planning. One may deduct that the FANC is an active participant in the environmental matters, 
especially when bearing in mind that not all cases are centralized to Vaasa, text at fn(67)ff. 
31 Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 31 and 33 §, Mäenpää (n 29) 355–9, Mäenpää (n 10) 252. 
32 Vihervuori (n 18) 500, Mäenpää (n 10) 242–3. This is also spesifically noted in the Austrialian context, in 
which the tribunal dealing with environmental matter is explicitly ’not bound by the rules of evidence’, Ky 
(n 22) 216. 
33 Mäenpää (n 10) 243, 245. 
34 Vihervuori (n 18) 504, see Chapter 3 on the first instance administrative authorities in general. 
35 Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 33 §, Administrative Procedure Act (hallintolaki 434/2003) 31 § and 
32 §, legally non-binding English translation available at 
<http://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030434.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018). 
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have witnessed reassuring developments in both the organizational arrangements and in the judges’ 
self-understanding.36 
 
The forward-looking nature of environmental matters and emphasis on scientific knowledge 
characterize the investigation and active role of the courts, and are also relevant when it comes to 
acquiring the necessary expertise. 37 In environmental cases, several parties and stakeholders are 
typically present, the hearing of whom is part of the procedure. Participatory rights are secured 
according to the obligations of the Århus Convention and environmental NGO’s have actively 
employed their right to participate, including their right to appeal the authorizations.38 Interestingly it 
has been evaluated that the type of inquisitorial procedure in use in Finland may encourage appeals 
from private parties or environmental NGO’s.39 As is common in administrative cases in general, 
party relationships in environmental matters are more complex than in standard civil or criminal 
litigation. Even when the multiple relations and even conflicting interests were in general properly 
managed, the role of the first instance administrative authority in the subsequent procedure is 
somewhat equivocal.40 The courts are obliged to obtain a statement from the administrative authority 
but otherwise the authorities are not considered a party. The situation is confusing and a committee 
considering the developmental needs of the court system has pointed it out as one aspect in need of 
clarification.41  
                                                         
36  Mäenpää, Olli ’Hallintoprosessi – hallinnon valvontaa vai oikeuksien turvaa? (Administrative Judicial 
Procedure – Supervising the Administration or Securing Individual’s Rights?)’ (2007) 3 Oikeus 325, 330. 
37 Vihervuori (n 18) 506–7. 
38 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), done at Aarhus, Denmark on 25 June 1998. Finland 
has been part of the Aarhus Convention since 2004. At times the manner in which eNGO’s place appeals may 
appear as a way to challenge nationally accepted but internationally and scientifically contested practices. 
This is the case with e.g. environmental permits for peat production in which peat is excavated from the 
wetlands and used as an energy source, Pärnänen (n 30) 126. The internationally accepted scientific stance on 
the matter is that practice extremely harmful in combating climate change: ‘Drainage of wetlands is associated 
with potentially large carbon losses as organic matter that has accumulated slowly over centuries to millennia 
is oxidized’ in IPCC Special Reports Land Use, Land-Use Change Change and Forestry, 4.4.6 Wetlands 
Management (eds Robert T. Watson, Ian R. Noble, Bert Bolin, N. H. Ravindranath, David J. Verardo and 
David J. Dokken, Cambridge University Press 2000), available online at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/land_use/index.php?idp=196> (accessed 10 March 2018). 
39 Tegner Anker et al (n 14) 16. 
40 Vihervuori, Pekka ‘Ympäristö-, vesitalous- ja luonnonsuojeluasiat’ in Korkein hallinto-oikeus 90 vuotta 
(Otavan Kirjapaino 2008), 493, 497. 
41 Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 36 §, Memorandum of the Committee on the Development of Court 
System 2003 (tuomioistuinlaitoksen kehittämiskomitean mietintö KM 2003:3), 23, 85.  
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Even when the courts actively investigate the case, the main responsibility to obtain the necessary 
information lies with the parties: the authority or the court merely instructs them or suggests what 
piece of information is desired for the decision-making. Even though the party is not obliged to 
‘establish the evidence’ in favour of their case, it is in their interest to provide the authority or court 
with all the information they consider necessary for the decision to favour their stance. In certain 
cases this responsibility is detailed in pieces of legislation, as is the case with the EPA and the 
Environmental Protection Decree, which include detailed lists of information that the operator must 
deliver in order to have their project considered.42  
 
Thus the principle of judicial investigation obliges the courts and administrative authorities to 
perform inclusive, even holistic, procedures in order to examine and discern the matter as thoroughly 
as necessary. In this the outcome resembles that of the Indian NGTs, in which the broad powers and 
diverse expertise available support investigative and inquisitorial procedure, not to mention the fact 
that there the proactive Supreme Court and the judiciary in general were the protagonists of the 
NGT’s emergence in the first place.43 In Finland the prohibition of decisions contra legem acts, 
along with the above-mentioned prerequisites, as the ultimate line not to be crossed, but within these 
limits the scope of judicial review is broad.44 In practice, since the judiciary is trusted to deliberate 
without many external constraints, comprehensive use of scientific knowledge is possible, especially 
when that knowledge is readily available in the courts themselves. This is also a two-way street: 
Tegner Anker and others have speculated that ‘[t]he court’s attitude towards a restricted or a full 
review may be partly dependent on their knowledge of the substantive issues’ – in other words, the 
presence of in-house expert judges might even influence the court’s interpretation of its own scope of 
review. 45 From these substantial considerations we now move on to more procedural parts, the 
manners in which scientific knowledge can be obtained. 
 
3 FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES: PERMITS AND 
SURVEILLANCE 
                                                        
42 The EPA 39 1, the Environmental Protection Decree (Valtioneuvoston asetus ympäristönsuojelusta 
713/2014) Chapter 2 (3–10 §). 
43 Gill (n 13) 185, 187, Amirante (n 2) 454–5. 
44 Koulu, Risto Lainkäyttöä vai hallintolainkäyttöä (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 2012) 187.  
45 Tegner Anker and others (n 14) 17. It must nonetheless be acknowledged that during the 1990s, when the 
Supreme Administrative Court gradually ceased to refer cases to the Government, there were no changes in 
the SAC’s organizational structure regarding the expert judges, see text at fns(24–28). 
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A glance is now taken at the Finnish first instance administrative authorities in order first, to explain 
the understanding of administration’s role in Finland and second, to outline the procedural path of 
environmental matters before they enter the courts. 
 
In principle, the first instance administrative authorities exist to protect the general interest: they are 
to exercise administrative authority but not possess it. That is why legality, impartiality, and 
objectivity are of such significance in the administrative work: they are understood as elements of 
substantial equality, as opposed to its formal counterpart.46 The administration of environmental 
matters adheres to these principles and thus the outcome that is reviewed in courts ought to be as 
impartial and objective as possible.  
 
In practice the Finnish first-tier environmental administration includes both issuing the 
administrative authorizations and their surveillance. The former includes both environmental permits 
that the operator must apply for and the registration procedure available for lesser activities: the 
authority, either the Regional State Administrative Authority (‘the RSAA’) or municipalities, may 
then accept them as applied or issued, decline them or accept them with certain conditions.47 The 
supervision of the permitted activity is mainly conducted by a separate authority called the Centre for 
Economic Development, Transport, and the Environment (‘the CEDTE’). 48  Even though the 
supervision is based on the operator’s self-surveillance, since 2014 in cases dealing with the EPA the 
supervisor has had more detailed scope of inspection to better intervene during ‘practice as usual’ 
and in cases of exceptional circumstances. The supervisor’s ultimate tool is administrative 
compulsion, even to the extent of suspending operations (not frequently used option).49 The state 
regional administration will most likely be completely transformed in the coming years, giving the 
country new regional environmental authorities yet again.50  
                                                        
46 Mäenpää (n 10) 252, Mäenpää (n 29) 355–416.  
47 The registration is regulated in the EPA Chapter 12 and the activities requiring registration are detailed in 
the EPA’s Annex 2. Four of the six RSAA’s deal with environmental matters. 
48 Even though the environmental units in the CEDTE’s are mainly concerned with supervision in some nature 
conservation matters, they are the decision-making authority. Also the CEDTE’s have specialized in certain 
subject matters. 
49 Supervision and administrative enforcement is regulated in the Water Act Chapter 14 and in the EPA 167–
189 §. 
50 Both the RSAA’s and CEDTE’s are in their current form relatively new institutions. However, Finland’s 
health care, social services and regional administration system is facing extensive transformation under 
current Prime Minister Sipilä’s government.  The details of the upcoming changes are yet to be confirmed at 
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Finnish communities have traditionally enjoyed a strong and independent position, as seen in 
environmental matters, where municipalities are bestowed with administrative authority in some 
lesser activities with environmental impacts. Since the country of 5,5 million inhabitants consists of 
311 municipalities, most of them are small in size. This results in collaboration among municipalities 
in fulfilling their obligations, including ones concerning the environment. The collaboration naturally 
enhances the (amount of) expertise at hand during permit preparations. This is increasingly 
beneficial when the decision-making itself occurs in politically-elected municipal boards, which may 
not contain much expertise on environmental matters.51 The rectification process is commonplace 
when the decision-making authority is located in the municipalities. However, administrative courts 
are the usual appeal authority in environmental matters: access to them is largely unconstrained and 
widely available, though minor exceptions naturally exist. In the municipalities and the RSAA’s the 
extent of available scientific—and legal—expertise varies greatly. In the largest municipal 
collaboration units or RSAA’s, the personnel may have diverse scientific backgrounds and several 
lawyers may be available, whereas in smaller units only only a few persons with no legal training 
share the workload. Thus, if appealed, the cases brought to the administrative courts may be diverse 
in quality and in the width of the scrutiny employed. 
 
4 APPEALS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS  
With this rudimentary knowledge of Finnish administrative system in environmental matters, we are 
guided by the key institutions: the administrative courts. Appeals in administrative judicial matters 
come in different categories, among which municipal appeals and administrative appeals are pivotal 
(but difference of which has no significance in our examination). Environmental matters are mainly 
treated as administrative appeals even when the first instance administrative authority is located in 
the municipality. Before going in detail on their access to scientific expertise, a short glance is taken 
at the general procedure in which the cases are heard at the courts. 
 
In Finland, both in administration and in administrative courts, a referendary prepares the case for 
decision. Referendaries are court officials like the judges and are present during the deliberations. 
They are allowed to participate but do not have the right to vote, should there be a disagreement that 
is solved by voting. The system is rooted in the Finnish Constitution, which includes sections on the                                                                                                                                                                                           
the time of writing, despite the fact that the new administration is planned to go into operation in January 
2020. 
51 The Municipality Act (kunnallislaki 410/2015) 30 § and Chapter 10 on elected officials, 69–86 §. 
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referendaries and their right to give a dissenting opinion on the decision, liberating them from 
official responsibility.52 Even though the titles are similar to those e.g. in the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘the CJEU’), the work of a Finnish referendary differs from that of their European 
counterpart, especially in the independence of their position as civil servants.53 This secures the 
liberty of their position.54 However, independence of position does not imply independence from the 
judges: the referendary in Finland is not considered to be independent in that regard, as is e.g. the 
Advocate General in the CJEU. In Finland the preparation of the case is understood more as an 
internal process of the court or authority, entwined with the overall procedure.55 The referendary and 
the preparatory work are integrated parts of the court’s (or authority’s) proceedings. The persons 
holding the position perform their work independently but the outcome is for the institution’s 
internal use only. Interestingly, there has been no discussion that the referendary’s stance ought to be 
made public to the parties before the main hearing, so strongly is the referendary’s work considered 
to be part of the court deliberations (in contrast to the solution chosen in the CJEU). The system is 
intertwined also in the sense that a judge can also work as a referendary and present the case for the 
hearing but only in the administrative courts, not in the SAC.56 
 
4.1 Call The Experts… 
                                                        
52 Constitution of Finland 118.2 §. 
53 This makes the referendaries independent of the opinion of the judge or judges whom they serve: their 
appointment or further career is not bound to their opinion, Kanninen, Heikki, ’KHO:n esittelijä ja EY:n 
tuomioistuimen lakimiesavustaja – sama työ, eri asema’ in Korkein hallinto-oikeus 90 vuotta (Otavan 
Kirjapaino 2008) 577, 585, 589–95. The referendary system is thus strongly linked to the Finnish 
understanding of the responsibility of an official for the legality of their actions, established in the 
Constitution of Finland 118 §. See also Mäenpää, Olli Hallintolaki ja hyvän hallinnon takeet (5th ed, Edita 
2016). 
54 Liberty of a position does not, however, render redundant discussion of the acceptability of the system in 
which persons other than judges are also present in the court’s deliberations or hearing, as has been witnessed 
in the European contexts. In the case Kress v France App no 39594/98 (ECHR, 7 June 2001) the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) considered the participation of a commissaire du gouvernement in the 
hearings to be an infringement of the Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights (a stance reiterated 
in a subsequent case Martinie v France App no 58675/00 [ECHR, 12 April 2006]). Also the role of the 
Advocate General in the CJEU has been discussed in the Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba 
[2000] ECR I-665, where at paras 11–12 the AG’s were considered to have the same status as judges and be 
acceptable in this regard; see also Ritter, Cyril ‘A New Look at the Role and Impact of Advocates-General—
Collectively and Individually’ (2006) 12 Colum. J. Eur. L. 751, 756–7, Kanninen, Heikki ‘Den 
kontradiktoriska principen och EG-domstolens generaladvokat’ (2001) JFT 6 619–31. 
55 See also text at fn(66)ff. 
56 The Court Act (tuomioistuinlaki 673/2016) 9:3. 
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Finland has six administrative courts, each with a jurisdiction of their own. As noted earlier, appeals 
on cases applying the EPA or the Water Act are centralized to the Vaasa Administrative Court.57 In 
such cases, an expert judge must be part of the court’s panel. Expert judges are experts on scientific 
or technical matters and their appointment and position is equal to the court’s lawyer judges, with the 
one exception that only a lawyer can be a panel chair.58 They work full time, in-house, and have 
been appointed permanently (by the president of the country), and all the regulations on judges apply 
equally to both types of judges. Before taking their position in court, most expert judges have gained 
experience in e.g. administration, research, or industry. 
 
The opportunity to gain from the expert judges’ experience is considered a benefit of the distinction 
between the Vaasa court and other administrative courts. Considerations that the differentiation 
enables better alignment of case law on certain matters have been presented. 59  However, the 
procedures on different substance matters might evolve too dissimilarly, obstructing the parties’ or 
their advocates’ abilities to deal with the appeal. Regionalization would decrease the physical 
distance of the applicant and the court, which is important in the case of oral hearings and especially 
on-site inspections. Oral hearings are however almost non-existent in environmental matters, a point 
in favour of the current arrangement.60 
 
The SAC is the court of final appeal on administrative matters. Previously, leave to appeal in 
environmental matters was not generally demanded, but as of January 1, 2018 the legislation was 
amended and leave to appeal is now demanded in matters concerning environmental protection, 
                                                        
57 Text at fn 5. It is noteworthy that even though here the focus is on the Vaasa court, many matters 
concerning the environment are adjudged in the regional administrative courts. 
58 Since the expert judges are full time ‘in-house‘ experts, the benefits from their knowledge are not restricted 
to the court panel deliberation only but also cover informal discussions during the preparations. The Vaasa 
court has eight permanent expert judges and currently two temporary ones. 
59 Distribution of Tasks Between the Administrative Courts. Memorandum of the Administrative Judicial 
Procedure’s Grade Working Group, Ministry of Justice, 23 November 2010. (‘The Distribution of Tasks 
Memo‘, Tehtävien jako hallintotuomioistuinten kesken. Hallintolainkäytön tasotyöryhmän mietintö. 
23.11.2010. Oikeusministeriön mietintöjä ja lausuntoja 78/2010) 85, 93. The topic in general was until now 
last time discussed in the Distribution of Tasks Memo. Since after that the preparatory works of different laws 
relating to administrative judicial system have not shown signs of reconsidering the solution, it might be seen 
as the legislator’s stance that expert judges are needed in certain case groups. 
60 E.g. according to the court’s rcords in 2016 the Vaasa administrative court had 1,048 pending cases on 
environmental, land use and planning matters on December 2016. During 2016 on-site inspections were held 
in 6 of those cases but oral hearings in none. (In total there were 21 oral hearings, all in cases dealing with 
social services and health care.)  
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waters use, soil excavation or land use and building.61 The SAC’s decisions, published on their 
website, have at times been treated as precedents although formally their position is not that of a 
precedent (Finland has witnessed long and intense debate on whether the SAC gives precedents or 
not).62 The newest reform concerning leave to appeal may yield change when the SAC becomes 
entitled to choose which cases it takes upon consideration and may, if it wishes, choose the ones with 
most value as precedents. Time will tell the effects of this novel amendment. 
 
When cases dealing with the EPA or the Water Act are adjudicated, the panel consists of five lawyer 
judges and two expert members—in other words cases that in Vaasa court are decided with expert 
judges, are in the SAC adjudged with expert members.63 Unlike in Vaasa court, the SAC’s expert 
                                                        
61 Collection of statutes 974–978/2017 (accepted 19 December 2017, in force 1 January 2018), Government’s 
Proposal 43/217 (HE 43/217). The proposal was jointly prepared by the Ministry of the Environment and the 
Ministry of Justice. 
62 The SAC also publishes short summaries of its decisions but those have lesser value, even though they may 
guide administrative and legal practice. Annually, some hundred decisions find their way to the annals, and 
another hundred are summarized on the webpage. 
For a glimpse of the discussion see e.g. Siltala, Raimo A theory of precedent: From Analytical Positivism to a 
Post-analytical Philosophy of Law (Hart 2000) and ‘Prejudikaateista ja tuomarin prejudikaatti-ideologiasta’ 
(1999) 5 Lakimies 674–691 — a critique to Siltala’s understanding is offered by Sajama, Seppo ’Raimo 
Siltalan prejudikaattiteoria’ in Esa Kolehmainen (ed) Oikeus ja kritiikki I (Forum Iuris 2009) 197–218. 
Sajama, Seppo ‘Prejudikaatit oikeuden kehityksessä’ in Tolvanen, Matti and Svensk, Niko (eds) Vero ja 
finanssi. Juhlakirja Matti Myrsky 60 vuotta. (Edita Publishing Oy 2013) 285–304; Myrsky, Matti 
Ennakkopäätökset verotuksessa (Alma Talent 3rd ed 2011); On whether voting influences the value of a SAC 
precedent, Sutela, Mika, Tarukannel, Veijo and Tolvanen, Matti ‘Ennakkopäätökset ja äänestäminen: 
empiirinen analyysi tuomareiden eriävien mielipiteiden esittämisestä korkeimmassa hallinto-oikeudessa’ 
(2014) 5 Lakimies 719, 730–2; and the most recent input analysing the question in the context of water law, 
Hepola, Matti ’Oikeuskäytännön tulkinnasta kalatalousvelvoitteita muutettaessa (Interpretations of case law 
when changing fish restocking obligations)’ in Määttä, Tapio (ed) Ympäristöpolitiikan ja -oikeuden vuosikirja 
(Itä-Suomen yliopisto 2017) 11–88.  
It could be summarized that formally speaking the SAC does not give precedents but in practise the published 
decisions  are closely followed and examined. Hence there is room to debate but the practitioners may find the 
matter to be less complicated. This interpretation is openly expressed in the context of Finnish Supreme 
Court: in their public webpage judge Mikko Tulokas expresses a similar stance in a blog-type entry entitled, 
‘Korkeimman oikeuden tuomioiden prejudikaattimerkitys ja tuomioiden perustelut’, Chapter 5, available 
online in Finnish at 
<http://korkeinoikeus.fi/fi/index/muutoksenhakijalle/korkeimmanoikeudentuomioidenprejudikaattimerkitysjat
uomioidenperustelut.html> (accessed 10 March 2018). 
63 The SAC also has other expert members participating in deliberations on cases concerning certain 
intellectual property rights. Expert judges take part in the decision-making when child welfare or mental 
health issues are decided upon in administrative courts but not longer when and if these cases are taken to the 
SAC, Kuusiniemi, Kari ‘Domstolarna och experterna: Hur trygga sakkunskapen i miljömål?’ in Gipperth, 
 18 
members are part-time and are appointed for a five-year term, often holding university 
professorships as their chief occupation. Their right to maintain their position is protected as much as 
the judges’ is, and so is their independence in their post.64 Temporarily appointed expert members 
provide diverse and up-to-date expertise to the SAC, and when the expert members work only part-
time the pool from which they are chosen is broad, enabling more leeway in finding the expert who 
best fulfils the requirements of the pending case.65 Due to their extensive scientific education they 
are considered capable of having a say on matters beyond their specific scientific field, thus being of 
aid with the paralegal material almost inevitably encompassed in the environmental matters.66 
 
4.2 …But Don’t, If Nature Conservation Is At Stake 
In Finland the European Union Species and Habitats Protection is mainly implemented through the 
Nature Conservation Act (‘the NCA’). 67 The CEDTE is responsible for e.g. establishing nature 
conservation areas and issuing derogations from species protection. In order to enhance its 
effectiveness and use of expertise, the authority of the CEDTE’s is in some cases centralized: for 
example, only one CEDTE considers the derogations from habitat protection according to the 
Habitat Directive’s Annex IV(a) and IV(b).68 Appeals regarding decisions concerning the NCA are 
adjudicated in the administrative court with territorial jurisdiction and the court of final appeal is the 
SAC. Thus the Vaasa court holds no specific position if the pending case deals only with the NCA 
and has no connection to the EPA or the Water Act, forming the only significant exception to the 
rule that the ‘environmental’ cases are centralized to the Vaasa court. Also in cases when the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Lena and Zetterberg, Charlotta (eds) Miljörättsliga perspektiv och tankevanor (Iustus Förlag AB 2013) 319, 
321. 
64 Within the five-year term, that is. The Court Act (673/2016) 17:1 and 17:2. 
65 Vakkilainen, Pertti, ‘Asiantuntijajäsenen rooli korkeimmassa hallinto-oikeudessa‘ in Korkein hallinto-
oikeus 90 vuotta (Otavan Kirjapaino 2008) 453, 457, 461. 
66 Kuusiniemi (fn 63) 330–1. Their independent position with regards to the parties of the case must neither be 
forgotten—in the Indian context the impartiality has been found significant, Gill (n 13) 180–1. 
67 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7. However, the protection of certain forest and aquatic habitat types are 
addressed by Forest Act Chapter 3 (metsälaki 1093/1996, legally non-binding English translation available at 
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1996/en19961093.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018)) and Water Act 
2:11 respectively. A legally non-binding English translation of since 2011 not consolidated version of the 
Nature Conservation Act (luonnonsuojelulaki 1096/1996) is available at 
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1996/en19961096> (accessed 10 March 2018). 
68 Governmental Decree on the CEDTE’s 1392/2014 4–17 §. The preparatory works do not mention expertise 
as a reason for centralization, only ‘centralizing resources’ is mentioned—‘resources’ could or could not refer 
to expertise as well as financial resources, Memorandum of the Decree n:o 1392/2014, 3. 
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CEDTE’s authority is centralized, the appeals administrative court is decided according to the 
principle of territorial jurisdiction (of the area or municipality in question).69  
 
Since the appeals court is chosen on a territorial basis, the expert judges available in Vaasa are not 
employed in these cases. Thus these cases are deliberated with the scientific knowledge acquired 
from the parties or the CEDTE in question. This applies also to cases that are taken to Vaasa on 
territorial grounds. This rather peculiar situation has a historical explanation: the predecessor of the 
Vaasa court in environmental matters was the Superior Water Court, which had expert judges, first 
water engineers and later also other technical and scientific experts. The Superior Water Court did 
not deal with matters concerning nature conservation whereas, on the contrary, the Water Act then 
regulated some matters now belonging to the scope of the EPA. When the Vaasa court was 
established this division between nature conservation matters and other ‘environmental’ ones was 
left untouched. Whether the situation is reasonable from today’s perspective is naturally a question 
worth pondering: the scientific complexity in nature conservation cases is hardly less demanding 
than in cases dealing with the EPA or the Water Act.70  
 
The counterintuitive situation has naturally generated certain challenges. The marching order 
between the environmental permits according to the EPA or the Water Act on one hand and permits 
to exempt from the protection according to the NCA on the other has not been clear. These two types 
of permits can be applied for and issued independently and separately from each other, apart from 
two exceptions: the evaluation of consequences to Natura 2000 areas must precede the 
environmental permits, as must permits to derogate from protection of certain aquatic water 
habitats.71 In the absence of a definite rule, interpretations have varied, and the SAC has opted for a 
point of view that since the legislator has remained silent, no categorical stance on the matter can be 
taken. 72 Often exemption from the NCA has not been on the agenda of undertakings requiring 
                                                        
69 Administrative Judicial Procedure Act (hallintolainkäyttölaki 586/1996) 12.2 §. Legally non-binding 
English translation not consolidated since 2003 is available at 
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1996/en19960586.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018). 
70 Kuusiniemi (n 63) 329–30. 
71 The NCA 65 § and the Water Act 2:11.2, the SAC 2006:7. 
72 The SAC 2013:173, Vihervuori n (40) 513–6, and also KHO 2015:3 (votes 5–2) and KHO 2006:7. The 
theme is recently discussed in Soininen, Niko ’Luonnonsuojelullisen poikkeusluvan ja hankeluvan välisestä 
edellytyssuhteesta ympäristöoikeudessa’ (2015) 4 Ympäristöjuridiikka 10-28; see also Belinskij, Antti 
’Turvetuotanto oikeudellisessa murroskohdassa’ in Ympäristöpolitiikan ja -oikeuden vuosikirja 2015 
(University of Eastern Finland 2015). 
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environmental permits.73 When environmental permits are deliberated in the courts of appeal and 
court of final appeal, expert judges can have their say on how permit conditions (regarding e.g. 
location or time) should be amended for the project not to harm interests protected in the NCA. This 
possibility does not, however, assist in situations where environmental permits are not required at all 
and the decision does not proceed to the Vaasa court. In these cases the territorial administrative 
court can refer only to the standard mechanisms with which to acquire scientific information in all 
other matters falling within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. These situations are 
examined in the following chapter. However, one must bear in mind that most often questions on 
Natura 2000 emerge in the permit procedures of the EPA or Water Act and while so, expert judges 
participate in dealing with the case. 
 
4.3 Internal And External Sources Of Scientific Expertise 
The broad scope of review and extensive interpretation of the principle of judicial investigation 
support reviewing the case as thoroughly as necessary. The expert members are not, however, the 
only source of scientific knowledge in the court, even when they would be part of the court’s panel. 
The expert judges in the court panel participate in evaluation of the acquired material like the lawyer 
judges do but are also free to use all their own scientific expertise in the deliberation. As already 
noted, the materials with which the case is adjudged can originate from various sources: from the 
authority or court itself, the parties, or from external experts in the form of statements or expert 
opinions.  
 
Administrative courts and, in some cases, administrative authorities can hear witnesses.74 The parties 
can also refer to expert statements in their reasoning. These expert opinion providers are not called in 
evidence but their role is to equip the court with adequate scientific knowledge in the specific subject 
matter—in cases where in-house expert judges are not employed, these expert statements form the 
only source of expertise. The expert statements are to be differentiated from the so-called ‘expert 
witness’, a category of witness hearing where the witness is called in to give evidence in a matter 
they have observed and employed their specific expertise while doing so. The testimony they give 
could not be gathered from a layperson, hence the differentiation.75 The legislation is not familiar 
                                                        
73 Case KHO 2013:173. 
74 The EPA 207 §, the Water Act 11:15, the Administrative Procedure Act 38 § and the Administrative 
Judicial Procedure Act 40 §. 
75 Vuorenpää, Mikko Asiantuntijatodistelun ongelmakohtia (Talentum 2012) 39. 
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with these kinds of expert witnesses: the categorization has been developed in the literature.76 Apart 
from hearing the witnesses the courts can ex officio obtain expert opinions if the case requires. 
Expert opinions can also be acquired in cases where an expert member or judge is part of the panel.77 
The reality of having in-house expertise readily at hand enables the court to better evaluate these 
external expert statements – acknowledgement of the challenges that the law/science interface poses 
to this facet was found highly relevant when developing the Indian NGTs.78  
 
The basic path to acquiring expertise is the statement procedure, which is justified by the obligations 
in the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act to thoroughly examine all aspects of the case. The 
substantial environmental legislation—including the EPA, the Water Act and the NCA—includes 
obligations for the administrative authority to inspect the matter, giving grounds for the statement 
procedure when found necessary. Statements can be obtained from e.g. a state supervisory authority 
with a territorial connection, or the authorities supervising public interest on the matter.79 When the 
first instance administrative authority considers the matter, they have liberty to exploit all the official 
materials necessary. If the authorization is appealed, the impartiality and hearing of the parties must 
be strictly provided for if further statements are requested from authorities that did not give 
statements at the earlier stage. Also, the physical site of the (planned) undertaking can be observed 
during an on-site inspection, either by the first instance administrative authority or the appellate 
court.80 Again in this procedural respect, the first instance administration and the judicial review of 
their activity are treated in a similar manner almost as if considered points on the same continuum.  
 
Thus even though expert judges form an established part of the appellate authorities’ work, their 
expertise is not the sole source of scientific knowledge in the court. Expert judges can be categorized 
as an ‘internal’ source of expertise, whereas the other mechanisms would be ‘external’. Two 
mechanisms most likely complement each other: having an internal source of expertise readily at 
hand may enhance the likelihood of the court to be able to know when to pay closer attention to the 
                                                        
76 Vuorenpää (n 75) 24. 
77 Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 40 §, Vuorenpää (n 75) 55. 
78 Gill (n 13) 183. Amirante does not explicitly discuss this aspect but contextualises the Indian NGT’s with 
the global growth of green tribunals, a phenomena that exists partly due to this issue, Amirante (n 2) 446–8. 
79 The EPA 42 § and the Water Act 11:6. 
80 Regarding the first instance, the Administrative Procedure Act 38 § and regarding the appellate authorities 
The EPA 197.1 §, the Water Act 15:4.2, the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 41 §. Even though 
possible, on-site inspections conducted by the SAC are  rare. 
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scientific side of the case, or which questions to ask about it from the external sources of expertise.81 
The benefit of having impartial scientific knowledge is also a noteworthy factor when multiple 
interests often seek to interfere with environmental decision-making, and where the courts may be 
overwhelmed by the task of assessing the environmental knowledge provided by ‘external’ scientific 
experts. This aspect was of central influence when India initiated the NGTs.82  
 
The principle of contradiction (or adversarial proceedings), however, adds an interesting twist in 
both the external and internal mechanisms with which the courts can or must expand their scientific 
understanding. According to the principle of contradiction, the parties must be reserved an 
opportunity to comment on the demands of others and the evidence potentially affecting the 
resolution of the matter.83 This principle can be evaded in only minor issues, such as when the claim 
is dismissed without considering its merits or when it is immediately rejected.84 Not only courts but 
also the first instance administrative authorities are bound by the principle.85  
 
The principle of contradiction causes no problems in cases when the parties themselves provide the 
courts with the information necessary for the decision-making, or if the information is acquired in 
the on-site inspections or (the infrequent) oral hearings. In environmental matters, especially when 
dealing with the EPA or the Water Act, the administrative authorities are under a broad obligation to 
communicate the pending matter not only to the parties and stakeholders but also to the general 
public.86 Only rarely is the matter such that the public could not be informed—protection of business 
secrets or the exact location of a nature conservation site might constitute such—and even in these 
cases the information that is not under constraint must be disclosed.  
 
However, when an expert member is part of the court panel, the parties are not separately informed 
of their stance. This could be seen as a disadvantage of the Finnish system: since the deliberation of 
the court panel takes place behind closed doors, the parties will never know how the scientific 
experts evaluated the subject matter and whether their evaluation had a decisive role in the                                                         
81 More on this at discussion, see text at fn(97)ff. 
82 Gill (n 13) 177–180, 183 and the literature on the challenges of biased scientific knowledge and the risk of 
misuse of science in the law referred to in fn’s 16 and 21. 
83 The Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 34.1 §. 
84 The Administrative Judicial Procedure Act 34.2 §. 
85 The Administrative Procedure Act 34 §.  
86 The Water Act 11:10–11, the EPA 85 §. The latter includes an exception from the Publicity Act’s 16.3 § 
(The Act on the Openness of Government Activities, julkisuuslaki 621/1999) not to disclose the site of the 
planned undertaking. 
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reasoning—the said naturally applies also to the lawyer judges. Characteristic to this detail is the 
manner in which scientific and legal analysis are entwined in environmental reasoning: both the 
expert members and the lawyer members participate freely in the court’s deliberations, having liberty 
to have a say in whole of the matter, both legal and scientific questions included.87 The work of the 
expert judge can hardly be dissected from the discussions – after all, in order to do so, the 
deliberation of administrative environmental matters should fall neatly into the categories of facts 
and norms, which it rarely does.88 Even though the in-house expert judges are slightly problematic 
from the viewpoint of the contradictory principle, the solution opted for in Finland enables broad and 
knowledgeable examination of the matter and all its aspects. 
 
5 EXPERTISE, IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDGES, AND ALLOCATION OF THE CASES 
The merging of scientific and judicial enquiry, the wide scope of review, and the broad interpretation 
of ‘legality’, put together, result in both the lawyer and expert judges having relatively free hands in 
their deliberations. Hence the significance of a fair trial, impartiality of the judges, and distribution 
of cases: the procedure within the courts can either hinder or encourage the successful performance 
of the given task. Thus these aspects are examined next. 
 
The principles of fair trial, specified in the Court Act, require that the court itself distributes the cases 
to judges (and referendaries), with no external influence allowed. The criteria must be chosen in 
advance, be acceptable and clearly articulated, and must comply with the court’s regulation (also 
known as ‘standing orders’, referring to the court’s internal procedural guideline). However, the 
characteristics of each court, such as chamber divisions, grouping of cases and securing language 
rights (the country has two official languages and the obligation to secure indigenous groups’ 
language rights, namely the three Sámi languages spoken in its jurisdiction), may affect the 
                                                        
87 The Union water law, namely the Water Framework Directive, is the prime example of the merging of 
scientific and legal evaluation in environmental regulation. The manner in which this occurs is explained in 
detail in Paloniitty, Tiina ’Taking aims seriously–how legal ecology affects judicial decision-making’ (2015) 
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 6(1), 55, 59–62. Of the more general question of the merging 
of scientific and judicial questions see fn (82) and text at it. 
88 Of the discussion on fact/norm dichotomy see e.g. Putnam, Hilary The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy 
and other essays (Harvard University Press 2002) 9, and of the benefits of retaining a distinction, not 
dichotomy, Del Mar, Maksymilian ’Relational jurisprudence—Vulnerability between Fact and Value’ (2012) 
2(2) Law and Method 63, 66–7, 69–71; Del Mar, Maksymilian ’Legal fictions and legal change in the 
common law tradition’ in Legal fictions in theory and practice (Springer 2015) 225, 226 and of how this 
relates to environmental law, Paloniitty, Tiina The (In)Compatibility Between Adaptive Management and 
Law—Regulating Agricultural Runoff in the EU (Juvenes Print 2017), 98–101. 
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decisions. The overall rationale is to secure the individual’s right to an impartial and neutral judge.89 
Issues of ‘internal independence’ can arise not only between judges of different court levels but also 
between different judges in the same court, or between judges and their presidents in the court.90 
Completely random allocation of the cases may increase the internal independence of the court but 
result in lack of effectiveness and efficacy. 91  Thus allocation or assignment of cases and 
specialization of judges form a fragile balance. On the one hand the judges ought to be granted the 
chance to specialize in certain cases to develop their much-valued expertise, while on the other the 
allocation of cases ought to be non-partisan and justified by objective and general criteria—the 
parties should not have the right to pick and choose their judge.  
 
International guidelines on the matter emphasize the same fair trial principles that apply in Finland: 
cases should be allocated with transparent and objective criteria. The UN General Council had a say 
on the matter in 1985, emphasizing the nature of allocation of cases as internal to the judicial 
administration.92 The Venice Commission, a subordinate commission of the European Council, had 
participants from various legal systems and questioned the relationship between objective allocation 
of cases and the special expertise a judge may possess. The Venice Committee recommends 
allocation to be random but simultaneously acknowledges that judges’ specialisations may give 
grounds for different solutions, as long as the allocation criteria fulfil the general conditions and are 
decided upon in advance. Given that there is an exemption from this rule, it should be a reasoned and 
motivated one.93 An inter-European comparison examining how the court rules on case allocation 
affect judicial integrity and impartiality found that, contrary to the hypothesis, the differentiation 
                                                        
89 The Court Act 8:7, Government’s Proposal for the Court Act (HE 7/2016), 81. The Finnish legislation on 
the matter follows the general fair trial guidelines as recommended by e.g. European Council in 2010. 
90 Mattila (n 19) 281, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) ‘Report on 
the Independence of the Judicial System Part I: The Independence of Judges’ (16 March 2010 CDL-
AD(2010)004) available at <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2010)004-e> (accessed 10 March 2018), paras 68 and 72.  
91 Fabri, Marco and Langbroek, Phillip ‘Is There a Right Judge for Each Case? A Comparative Study of Case 
Assignment in Six European Countries’ 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies, available at 
<http://www.ejls.eu/2/31UK.htm> (accessed 10 March 2018), 292, 308–9. 
92  Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (UN General Assembly Resolutions 40/32, 29 
November 1985 and 40/146 13 December 1985), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx (accessed 10 March 2018)  
93 The Venice Commission 2010 (n 60) paras 73 and 81. See also European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice, European judicial systems: efficiency and quality of justice (Council of Europe Publishing, 2012). 
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between jurisprudential and legalistic legal cultures played no significant role regarding the 
flexibility or rigidity of the allocation mechanisms in use.94  
 
Naturally, the expertise the Venice Committee had in mind was of the legal kind, becoming visible 
as legal competence, expertise and specialization. In the Finnish context, the same principles must be 
expanded to include expert judges as well. The limited number of expert judges, however, affects the 
allocation of cases, in both Vaasa and in the SAC. In Vaasa there are eight full-time and permanent 
expert judges and all three court chambers deal with environmental matters; in the SAC one of the 
four chambers deals with matters on land use and environment.95 The new Court Act from 2017 
resulted in redrawing the courts’ regulation and the work resulted in communication on the issue—
thus fairly recently the judges have had opportunities to ponder the subject of allocation.  
 
The stance adopted in e.g. the SAC’s memorandum is that there are no obstacles to allocating the 
cases based on the judges’ expertise—judicial, scientific, or otherwise—as long as the criteria is 
chosen in advance.96 In this regard the expert and lawyer judges must be treated similarly even if the 
type of their expertise would differ. It is indisputable that when expert judges are part of the court’s 
panel the choice of judges is not as free and random as it would be were expert judges not used. That 
is a deficiency in the Finnish model. However, the system of in-house expert judges does not affect 
the other sides of the fair trial principle: the parties are not allowed to choose their judges and the 
allocation of the cases is otherwise as random as possible. 
 
6 DISCUSSION 
In her study on legal questions and scientific answers, Wahlberg explains how much in 
environmental regulation and legislation gets lost in translation. Due to the ontological differences 
between scientific and legal enquiry, the law drafters (and to some degree judges discerning 
environmental matters) are not always capable of asking the most relevant or accurate questions 
about the scientific realities that underpin the ecological or social phenomena that are to be                                                         
94 The traditional typology was so futile that the researchers suggested abandoning it in future works on the 
theme. Courts from various countries were included in the study but Finland or Sweden were not included; 
Denmark represented the Scandinavian solution,  Fabri and Langbroek (n 91) 299–300, 313. 
95 As noted in the beginning, not all cases considered ‘environmental’ go to Vaasa court; some go to territorial 
administrative courts, see text at fn(66)ff. The Vaasa court has also two temporaral expert members. Generally 
on the Finnish administrative court system see Tegner Anker and others (n 14) 13–4, Fig. 3. 
96 Working Group Memorandum: Principles for allocation of cases in the Supreme Administrative Court, 27 
October 2016 (Asioiden jakamisen perusteet korkeimmassa hallinto-oikeudessa. Työryhmän mietintö 
27.10.2016). The communication is unpublished but distributed within the judiciary. 
 26 
regulated. There are multiple reasons for this: due to their own constraints, scientists are (also) 
obliged to consider legally non-relevant factors in their studies; the courts do not adequately 
understand or employ statistical evidence; the very concepts of ‘probability’ or ‘causality’ are 
understood differently in the realms of science and law. On top of these more familiar 
considerations, the scientific information itself may have a limited ability to answer legal questions: 
‘answers to scientific questions do not automatically serve as answers to legal questions,’ as 
Wahlberg summarizes.97  
 
The first and foremost beauty of the Finnish system is that the judges are not compelled to formulate 
and pose questions for the scientific experts to answer. When the judges’ panel deliberates the case, 
the scientific expertise is present in the discussion, formulating the case and the scientific realities it 
entails. Even when the panel decides to hear expert witnesses or gain expertise otherwise, the 
questions asked are formulated not only by the lawyer but also by the expert judges. The 
internalization of expertise in the Finnish administrative courts on most environmental matters 
elegantly solves one of the most fundamental problems of environmental regulation and litigation. In 
this spesific regard the Finnish and Indian solutions are of equal value, as both have in-house 
expertise present in the court panel’s dicussions. The Dutch option of having an external scientific 
unit (colloquially known as the StAB) providing answers to the judges’ questions underlines the 
importance of this matter: at times the scientific experts in the unit can guide the judges’ 
understanding of the factual side of the case and help them rephrase their queries. 98  When 
environmental matters are decided on in the Finnish administrative judicial system, facts and norms 
may become entangled during the decision-making, if such a holistic approach is needed to resolve 
the matter.99  
 
This emphasizes at the same time the frailties of the Finnish system – from this perspective not 
fulfilling the potential that the solution encompasses appears even more imprudent. The distinction 
between the cases dealing with the NCA only (with no reference to the Water Act or the EPA) and                                                         
97 Wahlberg, Lena Legal Questions and Scientific Answers: Ontological Differences and Epistemic Gaps in 
the Assessment of Causal Relations (Lund University 2010) 14–6, available online at 
<http://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5495800/3990729.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2018). In its ontological part, 
Wahlberg’s work focuses on causalities: legally relevant relations, legally relevant causes and effects, where 
the manner in which environmental regulation orients to the future—asking prospective rather than 
retrospective questions—becomes crucial, ibid 27, 71. 
98 Gill (n 13). According to Backes, ’[i]n complicated cases, the StAB can help the judges structure the factual 
aspects of the case and the relevant questions’ at fn 47 in Backes (n 15). 
99 See fn 82 and text at it. 
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the cases that deal with the last mentioned is unwise, if examined from the point of view of the 
scientific expertise present in the adjudication. The historical reasons behind the differentiation are 
naturally indisputable and justify the current state of affairs but the viewpoint adopted in this work 
does not support this solution. The greater the number of environmental cases taken to Vaasa, instead 
of the territorial administrative courts, the more extensive the benefit that the expert judges provide. 
These environmental cases are limited in number, also justifying centralization. 
 
The notions of the contradictory principle, court deliberations and hearing must be assessed in this 
context. Even though the demands of the contradictory principle would not be as extensively fulfilled 
in the Finnish system as in other legal systems (be they national or international, e.g. the CJEU) it 
can be assessed that the benefits of the system outweigh these weaknesses in the arrangement.100 The 
stances that expert judges take in court panels are not open to parties’ evaluations or comments, 
rightfully prompting the concerns of equality of arms or right to adversarial procedure.101 However, 
it appears that in Finland there is an inclination to frame the issue quite differently: the expert judges’ 
stances are not open to the parties but neither are the opinions of the lawyer members. From this 
perspective it is challenging to come up with convincing reasons for why the parties ought to have a 
say in the discussions that the judges hold during their closed deliberations, and in Finland ‘judges’ 
are here taken to mean any judge, irrespective of their educational background. It can be concluded 
that the benefits of this solution outweigh the problems the system might have with the contradictory 
principle, should there be any actual ones in the first place. 
 
The flexibility with which the Finnish system allows for confluence of facts and norms during the 
decision-making, combined with the broad scope of review, comprehensive understanding of the 
principle of investigation, and independent position of the referendaries, exemplifies the 
characteristics of Finnish society as a trust society. Finland ranks high in overall trust in institutions 
and the legal system is among the most trusted.102 The way that most environmental matters are dealt 
with in Finnish administrative courts vests the judges with a broad margin of consideration. This 
solution enables sensible decisions when the experts – legal and scientific alike – are given enough 
leeway to tackle their task thoroughly and earnestly. The Finnish environmental administrative                                                         
100 See the CJEU and the ECHR cases and literature referred to in fn 54 and text at it. 
101 I.e. the concerns acounting for the case Kress v France App no 39594/98 (ECHR, 7 June 2001) could be 
presented also of the Finnish system. 
102 The legal system comes second right after the police, Korhonen, Jouni and Nina Seppälä ‘Finland: The 
strength of a high-trust society’ in André Habisch and others (eds), Corporate social responsibility across 
Europe (Springer 2005) 13, 13–4. 
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judicial review has its closest cousin in the merits review conducted by the Australian environmental 
tribunal—however, the merits review is vested with greater leeway than is the case in Finland.103 
Interestingly, Cane claims that had the Australian merits review not been developed the judicial 
review would have developed towards broader understanding to occupy its space.104 The manner in 
which the Finnish SAC has ceased to refer cases to the Council of State on the grounds of 
expediency consideration (use of discretion) may support this speculation.105 
 
From the comparative viewpoint, the solution may seem unconventional or peculiar, but within the 
nation it has not been opposed; on the contrary it has been considered a sensible arrangement that 
serves the needs of environmental adjudication well. Nonetheless these characteristics of wider 
Finnish society form the gravest obstacle to the in-house expert judge solution as an easily 
transferrable legal transplant for other juridisdictions to adopt, given that such an option was viable 
in the first place.106 Simultaneously one must bear in mind that two nations with few common 
characteristics, Finland and India, both employ in-house expert members when environmental 
matters are dealt with in the (administrative) courts. The fact that India instigated its system only in 
this decade is a factor that other jurisdictions entertaining the need of a systemic amendment can take 
as an encouraging example.  
                                                        
103 Ky (n 22) 213–7. Whether they are first cousins twice removed or second cousins once removed is left for 
specific analysis to discern. For the discussion of Australian system see also Fisher (n 9) 136.  
104 Cane, Peter ‘Merits and Judicial Review: The AAT as Trojan Horse’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 212, 
243. 
105 See text at fn(24)ff. 
106 As Cohn states on an examination of legal transplants in the theme of this article, ‘no transplant is an 
island, and that complex modes of interaction color the process’, Cohn, Margit ‘Legal Transplant Chronicles: 
The Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United 
Kingdom’ (2010) 58(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 583, 583, 598; a critical stance on the 
whole concept of ‘legal transplant’ is offered in Örücü, Esin ‘Law as Transposition’ (2002) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 51(2) 205, 205. 
